A Positive, Communitarian Right to Security in the Age of Super-Terrorism by Turner, Ian David
Article
A ‘Positive’, ‘Communitarian’ Right to Security in the 
Age of ‘Super­Terrorism’
Turner, Ian David
Available at http://clok.uclan.ac.uk/15660/
Turner, Ian David ORCID: 0000­0002­8012­1480 (2016) A ‘Positive’, ‘Communitarian’ Right to 
Security in the Age of ‘Super­Terrorism’. Democracy and Security . pp. 1­25. ISSN 1741­9166  
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the work.
For more information about UCLan’s research in this area go to 
http://www.uclan.ac.uk/researchgroups/ and search for <name of research Group>.
For information about Research generally at UCLan please go to 
http://www.uclan.ac.uk/research/ 
All outputs in CLoK are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, including
Copyright law.  Copyright, IPR and Moral Rights for the works on this site are retained 
by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Terms and conditions for use 
of this material are defined in the http://clok.uclan.ac.uk/policies/
CLoK
Central Lancashire online Knowledge
www.clok.uclan.ac.uk
  
1 
 
A ‘Positive’, ‘Communitarian’ Right to Security in the Age of ‘Super-Terrorism’ 
 
Ian Turner 
 
Abstract 
 
Post 9/11, and especially with the dramatic rise of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL), the author advocates a collective right to security. Plotting a course through state 
absolutism and liberalism one ‘finds’ communitarianism as a philosophy to support this 
right to security. The author’s ‘communitarian’, right to security is based on an 
interpretation of European human rights law, particularly ‘positive’ duties of the state, to 
protect the rights to life of individuals from violations by non-state actors such as 
suspected terrorists. But for reasons of practical enforcement limitations to the exercise 
of the right are also articulated. 
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Introduction 
 
Post 9/11 the threat to the UK from Islamist terror groups such as Al-Qaeda has 
continued: there was the ‘Ricin case’, a plot to spread deadly ricin across London, in 
2003; and the ‘7/7’ suicide attacks on the London transport network, as well as four 
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failed suicide bombings two weeks later, in 2005. There was also the ‘Airline Bomb Plot’, 
a plot to detonate homemade explosives on airliners mid-flight over the Atlantic Ocean, 
in 2006; car bomb attacks in London and Glasgow in 2007; a failed suicide bombing in 
Exeter in 2008; the discovery of an explosive device on a cargo plane at East Midlands 
airport in 2010; the convictions of eight men conspiring to detonate suicide vests across 
various parts of the UK in 2012; and the murder of a soldier, Lee Rigby, in a London 
street in 2013. Whilst the threat to the UK’s security from Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan has decreased, with the killing of Osama Bin Laden by American Special Forces 
in May 2011, for example, acts of ‘super-terrorism’1 by other Islamist groups have not 
abated. In particular, there has been the spectacular rise of Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL), over the last few years with its beheadings of Westerners, such as James 
Foley, for example, videos of which were posted on the internet. Indeed, the murder of 
James Foley caused the UK government to increase its terror threat level from 
‘substantial’ to ‘severe’ in August 2014. The UK’s terror threat level remains at ‘severe’, 
meaning an attack is ‘highly likely’, at least two years later. More recently, ISIL has been 
responsible for targeting primarily close allies of the UK: its shootings at the Jewish 
Museum in Brussels, Belgium, in May 2014; the offices of the satirical magazine, Charlie 
Hebdo, in Paris, France, in January 2015; and a café and a synagogue in Copenhagen, 
Denmark, in February 2015. Lately, ISIL committed a massacre in Paris, primarily at the 
Bataclan Theatre, where 89 people were killed, in November 2015, and was responsible 
for two suicide bombings in Brussels at the airport and a train station, killing 31 people, 
in March 2016. According to the latest Global Terrorism Index, 2015, however, 78% of all 
deaths and 57% of all attacks in 2014 occurred in just five countries: Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Nigeria, Pakistan and Syria2. Indeed, excluding the 9/11 attacks, only 0.5% of deaths 
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from terrorism have occurred in the West since 2000.3 Thus, notwithstanding the 
continuous Islamist terror threats to the UK and its close allies since 9/11, these 
countries in the West are relatively safe. This is not to ignore ongoing threats to their 
collective security, however. Indeed, senior police officers across Europe now claim that 
the continent faces its highest terror threat since 9/11.4  
 
The threat to international peace and security from ISIL has been a cause of concern for 
the international community such as the United Nations (UN) for some time. Recently, 
the UN Security Council adopted a resolution, 2249 (2015), calling upon all Member 
States of the UN to take all necessary measures to prevent and suppress terrorist acts 
committed specifically by ISIL. States therefore need to remain strong and vigilant if they 
are to be successful in preventing, or at least reducing, Islamist terrorism from groups 
such as ISIL. Contributing to the debate about states’ need to provide effective 
protection to their citizens, this article supports a human right to security in the UK – but 
not the furtherance of the conventional, ‘negative’, right to security of the individual 
from the state: a ‘positive’, ‘communitarian’ right of security from threats to public 
safety from non-state actors such as suspected terrorists derived from European human 
rights law. 
 
Ordinarily, human rights act ‘negatively’, in that they reflect a traditional, liberal desire 
to restrain curtailments of individual freedom by the state; they are ‘freedoms from’ 
governmental intrusion. Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
for example, is the ‘freedom from’ torture. But the right also acts ‘positively’, in that it 
obliges countries to prevent violations of the freedom by non-state actors such as 
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suspected terrorists. A basis, therefore, for the author’s human right to security in the 
UK are the ‘positive’ obligations imposed on European states to, say, protect life, as per 
Article 2(1) of the ECHR, and prevent injury, as per Article 3 of the ECHR. (The author 
confines his approach primarily to the UK because European human rights law is directly 
applicable in the country’s domestic law, as per the Human Rights Act 1998, though the 
principles that European Human Rights Law articulates could easily translate to other 
states in the region, and elsewhere.) In addition, the author marries these ‘positive’ 
obligations with the philosophies of, say, communitarianism, to supply a theoretical base 
to his right of security. But before doing so, he discusses the ‘right to security’ – or at 
least refers to its many interpretations. 
 
Defining a right to security 
 
Surprisingly, explaining a right to security is not easy. Powell, for example, has expressed 
concern at the failure of human rights law to define exactly what the concept of security 
is: it is merely assumed that security is clearly understood and can be taken for granted.5 
In simple terms, Hein van Kempen says that security is described as freedom from 
threat, danger, vulnerability, menace, force and attack.6 But the ‘rather basic nature of 
this definition’ should not disguise the fact that there are many different forms of 
security, and that the meaning is both developing and highly contested.7 The following 
sub-sections explore the many approaches to security. 
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1. Negative individual security against the state 
 
The right to security is an example of a ‘First Generation’, ‘civil and political’, ‘negative’ 
right; a ‘freedom from’ state intrusion. (‘First Generation’ rights protect individuals from 
‘arbitrary’ killing, torture, slavery etc by the state.) The ‘substantive’ right to security of 
the individual from the power of the state – distinguishing it from, say, its ‘procedural’ 
element8 - is expressly provided for by several international and regional human rights 
documents. For example, Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) states: ‘Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.’9 Article 
5(1) of the ECHR is expressed in similar terms. Several human rights commentators 
examine only the ‘liberty’ element of Article 5(1) of the ECHR, paying no regard at all to 
‘security’.10 But the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in East African Asians v. 
United Kingdom11 suggested the terms were synonymous: ‘the protection of 
‘security’…is concerned with arbitrary interference, by a public authority, with an 
individual’s personal ‘liberty’.12 
 
2. Security as justification to limit human rights 
 
Many individual human rights, whether they be guaranteed by international, regional 
and/or domestic instruments, are ‘qualified’, in that they can be infringed by the state 
for legitimate purposes, one of which is safeguarding security. Article 19(2) of the ICCPR 
states: ‘Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression…’ But according to Article 
19(3) there are express limits to this freedom: ‘The exercise of the rights provided for in 
paragraph 2 carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject 
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to certain restrictions…(b) For the protection of national security or of public order...’ 
Regionally, Article 10(1) of the ECHR is the right to freedom of expression. But it is 
qualified, too, by Article 10(2), in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or 
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime etc assuming such interferences are 
‘necessary in a democratic society’. In addition to such ‘qualifications’ of general 
applicability, human rights law also provides for ‘derogations’, suspending specified 
freedoms in, say, times of ‘public emergency threatening the life of the nation’. Article 
4(1) of the ICCPR, for example, permits derogations in such circumstances ‘to the extent 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,’13 as does Article 15(1) of the ECHR. 
 
3. Positive individual security against the state 
 
Under human rights law an individual’s right to security can also be interpreted as an 
example of a ‘Second Generation’, ‘economic, social and cultural’, ‘positive’ right of the 
individual; a ‘right to’. For example, Article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) states: ‘The States Parties to the present Covenant 
recognize the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance.’14 
 
4. International or collective security 
 
The right to security also extends to a ‘Third Generation’, ‘collective’ right of peoples and 
groups of individuals. For example, Article 23(1) of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) states: ‘All peoples shall have the right to national and 
international peace and security.’ The Charter of the United Nations (UN) recognises 
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collective rights to security, too: one of the purposes of the UN, as per Article 1(1), is ‘to 
maintain international peace and security…’ Moreover, Article 2 of the Charter obliges 
UN members to ‘settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner 
that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered’ and must ‘refrain 
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state…’15 International security is also 
maintained by the four Geneva Conventions, 1949. Geneva IV, for example, protects 
civilians in armed conflicts. This principle is extended by the Conventions’ First and 
Second Protocols, 1977.16 
 
Within international security there is collective – or human – security.17 ‘Human security’ 
was one of a number of international principles agreed at the World Summit in 2005. 
These were subsequently adopted by a resolution of the High Level Plenary Meeting of 
the UN General Assembly in September 2005.18 There is no real consensus as to what 
human security exactly means, however.19 That said, there is a protection-based 
approach to human security, which focuses its attention on ‘freedom from fear’.20 It was 
this conception of human security which provided a theoretical foundation for the 
development of the ‘responsibility to protect (‘R2P’) concept to protect civilian 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.21 
‘R2P’ was another principle endorsed at the UN World Summit in 2005.22 Of note is 
paragraph 138 of the resolution adopted by the High Level Plenary Meeting of the UN 
General Assembly in 2005. This imposes not only obligations on countries to protect 
their civilians (‘Pillar I’), but also duties upon the international community to help states 
meet those obligations (‘Pillar II’). If a state has ‘manifestly failed’ in its duty to protect, 
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then paragraph 139 of the resolution refers to obligations to take concrete and collective 
interventionist measures on a case by case basis (‘Pillar III’). 
 
The central tenet of ‘R2P’ is that state sovereignty entails responsibilities as well as 
physical and political jurisdiction. The state may have the right to manage affairs within 
its borders, but it also has the fundamental responsibility of shielding populations within 
those borders from the four crimes outlined above.23 This principle, therefore, affirms an 
obligation on states not to remain neutral in the face of, say, genocide. Thus ‘R2P’ 
applies even where the harm has been inflicted by third parties such as armed rebel 
groups. Such a ‘positive’ or ‘substantive’ duty, enforceable against non-state actors, is 
well developed in human rights law, particularly in Europe. This obligation forms a 
foundation for the author’s right to security outlined in this piece. 
 
5. Positive state obligation to offer security to individuals against other individuals 
 
The final security concept, therefore, requires states to take ‘positive’ measures to 
prevent harms committed by third parties. In protecting individuals from violations of 
rights by non-state actors – killing, torture, enforced disappearance, slavery, for example 
– states, on a general level, must criminalise such abuses and to actively take measures 
to investigate, prosecute, convict and adequately punish those found to be responsible 
such violations. At an international level it will recalled that Article 9(1) of the ICCPR 
asserts a right to liberty and security of person. The distinctly ‘negative’ element of the 
right – that is, ‘freedom from’ state intrusion – was discussed above. However, the key 
point here is that this freedom also imposes a ‘positive’ duty on the state to formulate 
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policies and take concrete measures preventing infringements of the right by third 
parties. The UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) monitors states’ compliance of the 
ICCPR. In Jayawardena v. Sri Lanka,24 for example, the claimant alleged an infringement 
of his right to security, after the President of Sri Lanka had accused him in public of being 
involved with the terror group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (‘LTTE’), putting his 
life at risk. The HRC found that these accusations by the President had caused the 
claimant to be a victim of threats to his security by third parties, in violation of Article 
9(1).25  
 
Regionally, the concept of ‘positive’ obligations seems to be most developed in the case 
law of the ECHR, such as Article 3, freedom from torture and inhuman and degrading 
treatment and punishment;26 Article 4(1), freedom from slavery and servitude,27 
including human trafficking;28 Article 5, the right to liberty and security of person;29 and 
Article 8, the right to private and family life, home and correspondence.30 Pointedly, 
therefore, despite the ECHR’s general reiteration of ‘freedoms from’ the state, in many 
instances the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has drawn ‘positive’ obligations 
from the text of the ‘negative’ right itself. And the ECHR expresses positive obligations in 
discrete terms; for instance, Article 2(1) of the ECHR states that everyone’s right to life 
shall be protected by law.31 Similarly, Article 6 confers a right on individuals to receive a 
‘fair trial’ by an independent and impartial court or tribunal, which requires states, 
therefore, to publicly fund and staff an independent and adequate legal system that is fit 
for purpose. 
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Individual protections aside, the ECHR also imposes a ‘positive’ duty on member states 
to respect human rights in general. Indeed, the full title of the ECHR is the ‘Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’.32 Article 13 of the 
ECHR, for example, also requires states to take measures guaranteeing an effective 
remedy where there has been a violation of a right.33 And of particular significance for 
the meaning and scope of a right to security there is Article 1 of the ECHR: ‘The High 
Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention [my italics].’ Interestingly, therefore, we 
can question why security is specifically referred to in Article 5(1) of the ECHR?34 This 
does not imply that Article 5 is an ‘exception’ reflecting the lower status afforded to 
security. Instead, Article 1 affirms the centrality of security built into each of the ECHR 
rights rendering reference to it in any particular right, such as Article 5, arguably 
redundant. 
 
This author has identified many approaches to security as a human right, encompassing 
both ‘negative’ as well as ‘positive’ elements, but there is a tendency to see the right 
primarily in ‘First Generation’ terms; and within this, ‘liberty’ and ‘security’ seemingly 
represent the same freedom. Lazarus is perplexed, however. She states that national 
security policy, say, since the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington in 2001, has 
overwhelmingly focused on the ‘balance’ between ‘security’ on the one hand and 
‘liberty’ on the other. Given that liberty and security are articulated as part of the same 
right in most human rights documents, she suggests that this ‘binary opposition…is 
curious’.35 She concludes: amidst the extensive public debate on the appropriate balance 
between the maintenance of national, public and individual security on the one hand, 
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and the protection of individual liberty on the other, ‘remarkably little attention has 
been paid to the question of what precisely is meant by the right to security in the legal 
sense’.36 The implication of the argument here is that a human right to security, in law, 
could therefore be said to be ‘up for grabs’. This piece is (hopefully) a pitch for a specific 
interpretation of security. 
 
‘Super terror’ attacks by ISIL, for example, show no sign of decreasing. Indeed, discussing 
the level of threat to the UK from Islamist terrorism, Andrew Parker, the Director 
General of Britain’s Security Service (‘MI5’), recently noted: ‘We face a very serious 
threat that is complex to combat and unlikely to abate significantly for some time.’37 
With the ongoing threat to the UK and its allies from Islamist terror groups, human rights 
law, particularly in the European region, is especially relevant. Perhaps the UK’s positive 
duty to prevent harm committed by third parties – drawing on the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR, as well as specific articles of the ECHR such as Arts 1, 2 and 13 – can form the 
basis for a right to security from ISIL? A collective human right to security (though not in 
the sense as understood in international law – see above)? Of course human rights are 
traditionally seen as ‘freedoms from’ governmental abuse. But this piece has shown that 
a right to security has many approaches beyond the natural defence of the individual 
against arbitrary detention by the state. Many traditionalists will reject the approach to 
human rights articulated here as merely provocative and, therefore, insufficiently 
worthy of academic debate. But the author believes it is important to have this 
discussion. In law, for example, ‘freedom from torture, such as Article 3 of the ECHR, is 
‘absolute’ meaning it can never be infringed. Indeed, it cannot be suspended in times of 
war or public emergency, as per Article 15(2) of the ECHR. Is it wrong to debate the 
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absolute nature of ‘torture’, particularly, in the context of terrorism? In a special issue of 
the European Human Rights Law Review debating torture, the editor rejected claims that 
academic discussions about the nature of the right undermined its absoluteness:  
 
‘[I]f torture were not a legitimate topic for debate, it would never have been 
prohibited in the first place and the fact of its being prohibited as a matter of 
international law cannot and should not preclude its discussion: on the contrary, it 
demands it. It is a lack of debate which would be more worrisome since this would 
threaten to condemn the prohibition to obscurity.’38 
 
Thus, in having the debate about a positive, collective right to security, the consequence 
of which is naturally an augmentation of state power, this piece will also serve as an 
important reminder of the historical significance of human rights of the individual, even 
it if its ultimate aim post 9/11 is perhaps to challenge it! Indeed, in calling on the 
international community to take all necessary measures to prevent and suppress 
terrorist acts committed specifically by ISIL, as per UN Security Council Resolution 2249 
(2015) (see above), notably, this duty is not without limitation: it is prefaced by states’ 
human rights obligations, for example. Crudely, states are seeking to prevent terrorism, 
not introduce measures that are counter-productive because of the undermining of 
basic freedoms. It is hoped that this important consideration is not lost here. In the next 
section, the author seeks to provide a philosophical base for the approach to security he 
advocates in this work. 
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Theoretical justifications for the author’s right to security 
 
A foundation for the author’s conception of a right to security could be grounded in 
‘natural’ law theory, especially the concept of ‘natural’ rights. Some natural law theorists 
argue that rights are not created by governments but exist anterior to them and that 
governments are, in fact, created to secure these rights.  
 
1. Hobbesian ‘absolutism’ 
 
A particular feature of natural law theory has been the social-contract philosophy, a key 
exponent of which was Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Hobbes’ most famous work was 
Leviathan which was first published in 1651. Hobbes lived during a turbulent time in 
England’s history – the rule of King Charles I, the Civil War and the Cromwellian 
Commonwealth – so he was greatly concerned at the evil of state collapse. He sought, 
therefore, to effect a strong central authority that maintained peace and order. If not, 
anarchy, which Hobbes described as a ‘state of nature’, would ensue – a place where 
only the strong would survive.39 Human life in the ‘state of nature’ would be ‘solitary, 
poor, nasty, brutish, and short’.40 To avoid such horrors, individuals would come to 
organise themselves politically into a ‘Commonwealth’, entering into a tacit social 
contract – a bargain – between themselves, whereby they agreed to obey a sovereign 
chosen by the majority, in exchange for the sovereign providing them with security from 
the ‘state of nature’.41 As a theoretical foundation for his collective human right the 
author finds such an approach to security particularly seductive.  
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That said, Hobbes described the sovereign as a ‘mortal God’42 and literally described its 
power as ‘absolute’,43 suggesting a significant erosion of the rights of the individual. 
Indeed, when the commonwealth had chosen their sovereign, individuals’ political 
power was at an end and they lost all rights except such as the government would find it 
expedient to grant.44 For the greater good of peace and order, Hobbes said that 
individuals had to accept ‘some incommodity’.45 What might this ‘incommodity’ be? He 
believed that ‘the greatest that in any form of government can possibly happen to 
people in general is scarce sensible, in respect of the miseries, and horrible calamities 
that accompany a Civil War’.46 So, for Hobbes, even the burdens of oppressive 
government were better than a complete chaos of the kind individuals suffer in war-torn 
contexts, for example, where social security, policing and law enforcement have broken 
down. But this approach seemingly ignores the reason(s) why we may be entertaining a 
right to security in the first place: to protect the very principles of democracy we are 
seeking to defend. Indeed, in condoning an oppressive government – assuming it 
continues to provide peace and order – Hobbes arguably failed to appreciate how the 
state itself might pose a threat to security.47 Thus, the Hobbesian model does not fully 
acknowledge how the modern state can simultaneously act as a guarantor of and a 
threat to the security of individuals.48 And whilst we are facing a public emergency post 
9/11, or at the very least we were in 2001, are we still in such a situation to which 
Hobbes was referring? That is, if we did not subscribe to the Hobbesian-style contract, 
would we be facing anarchy? Arguably, we would be less secure, at least collectively 
rather than individually, but it is safe to say that this would not result in a collapse of civil 
order? Finally, the author questions whether it is valid to ‘trade-off’ every human right of 
the individual, such as freedom from torture, in the cause of security.49 
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Notwithstanding these concerns, the author does not dismiss the ‘absolutism’ of Hobbes 
entirely, in formulating a theoretical basis for his collective human right to security. First, 
is the Hobbesian state a prime facie threat to security? For Hobbes the interests of the 
sovereign were largely the same as those of the commonwealth (or at least a majority of 
the commonwealth) so the sovereign seemingly would not use its powers injurious to 
the security interests of the commonwealth as a whole.50 The sovereign, like the 
individual, was motivated by self-interest: it wanted to retain the loyalty of its citizens.51 
An oppressive regime that grossly stifled the liberty of its subjects could not hold their 
allegiance.52 Thus, there were in fact limits to the sovereign’s power. Indeed, the bargain 
between individuals was revocable: it was qualified and conditional on the sovereign 
providing effective security from the ‘state of nature’. That is, when the state ceased to 
fulfil its duty of protection it had exceeded its authority and the individual no longer 
owed the state a duty of obedience: ‘The obligation of subjects to the sovereign is 
understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth by which he is able to 
protect them.’53 The gross violations of human rights committed in, say, the Soviet Union 
and Germany under the brutal authorities of Josef Stalin and Adolf Hitler respectively, in 
the 1930s and 40s, were classic examples where states themselves had become grave 
threats to security. And there have been more recent systematic human rights abuses by 
authorities in Rwanda in 1994, Bosnia in 1995 and Libya in 2011, as well as the ongoing 
situation in Syria. (For many of those affected by these abuses, a Hobbesian ‘state of 
nature’ was probably much more preferable to the fate that awaited them.) In failing, 
therefore, to honour the deal they have struck in providing protection, these countries 
have therefore delegitimised themselves, from a Hobbesian perspective, and revoked 
the duty of obedience, permitting the individual a ‘right to resist’. Thus, the ‘absolutism’ 
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of Hobbesian philosophy still has much to offer the author in constructing a theoretical 
justification for his right to security. That said, as with any political and constitutional 
theory this approach does of course have its limitations. The author in this piece is 
therefore developing a conceptual model which involves a modification of the 
Hobbesian position through the incorporation of aspects of liberalism, for example. 
 
2. Liberalism 
 
For Hobbes bad government was preferable to no government. Not so for John Locke 
(1632-1704) who was writing a generation after Hobbes. Locke’s principal work, Two 
Treatises of Government, which was written between about 1679 and 1683, but not 
published until 1690, was a reaction to the allegedly tyrannical government of James II. 
In the Second Treatise Locke seemingly went further than Hobbes: Locke believed that 
the individual’s obligation to obey the state, in return for protection, ceased in 
circumstances less demanding than a return to the state of nature. He justified such a 
position thus: 
 
‘To tell people they may provide for themselves by erecting a new legislative, 
when, by oppression, artifice, or being delivered over to a foreign power, their old 
one is gone, is only to tell them they may expect relief when it is too late, and the 
evil is past cure. This is, in effect, no more than to bid them first be slaves…and 
men can never be secure from tyranny if there be no means to escape it till they 
are perfectly under it.’ 54 
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Furthermore, again in apparent opposition to Hobbes, Locke did view the ‘absolute’ 
power of the sovereign as a threat to the security of individuals. He therefore advocated 
a minimal state whose control was limited to its preservation and could not be used ‘to 
destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the subjects.’55 With a significant reduction 
in the sovereign’s control many more ‘natural rights’ of the individual eg ‘life, liberty, and 
estate (property)’ were guaranteed, which could not be removed without the 
individual’s consent.56 Of these property was the most important, the protection of 
which was the chief reason for instituting government.57 
 
The social contract theory of Locke was particularly prevalent in the 17th and 18th 
Centuries and influenced, say, the revolutions of America and France. For example, 
section 3 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, 1776, expressly refers to the state’s duty 
to provide security: ‘That government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common 
benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or community…’ But when the 
state is ‘found [to be] inadequate [my italics]…a majority of the community has an 
indubitable, inalienable, and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish it, in such 
manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal.’ Thus, the individual’s right 
of rebellion exists in circumstances less than a failure to by the state to protect people 
from a ‘state of nature’. France’s Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 
1789, expresses similar values in Article 2: ‘The aim of all political association is the 
preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, 
property, security, and resistance to oppression [my italics].’ 
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Liberal philosophy, as propounded by John Locke, is concerned about a right to security, 
as is the ‘absolutism’ of Thomas Hobbes. But Lockean liberalism is unwilling to surrender 
some fundamental, ‘natural’ rights such as liberty and rights to property for peace and 
order, because too much sacrifice by the individual is itself a threat to security. This 
conflicts with the opinions of the author, who is willing to sacrifice some ‘natural’ rights 
for the maintenance of peace and security (see more later). There is, therefore, an 
argument for some ‘balance’, however, between other freedoms of the individual, to do 
as they please, and society’s need for protection against the harm that that person may 
commit, which some within contemporary liberalism, such as Jeremy Waldron have 
(reluctantly, it seems) acknowledged. 
 
Waldron begins by echoing a classic liberal concern: whilst reducing liberty may prevent 
an action taking place which would otherwise pose a risk of harm, it necessarily also 
increases the power of the state, and there is a corresponding risk that this enhanced 
power may also be used to cause harm.58 And he says that the state is always looking to 
limit liberty, and a terrorist emergency provides a fine opportunity: ‘People become 
more than usually deferential to the demands of their rulers in these circumstances and 
more than usually fearful that if they criticize the proposed adjustments they will be 
reproached for being insufficiently patriotic.’59 However, Waldron does acknowledge 
that liberty cannot be comprehensive even under the most favourable circumstances — 
‘nobody argues for anarchy’ — and security has to be given some weight in determining 
how much liberty people should have. So there is always a balance to be struck.60 And 
that the balance is ‘bound to change’ as the threat to security becomes graver or more 
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imminent.61 But he believes that the ‘balancing rhetoric’ needs to be subjected to 
‘careful scrutiny’. And calls for, say, evidence justifying greater security:  
 
‘If we do remain receptive to the need to compromise civil liberty, we must insist 
that those who talk the balancing-talk step up to the plate with some actual 
predictions about effectiveness. We should not give up our liberties, or anyone 
else’s liberties, for the sake of purely symbolic gains in the war against terrorism.’62 
 
Lucia Zedner is also cautious about embracing further security. She suggests that if 
security were an unqualified good, logically there could not be too much of it but there 
are several ‘paradoxes’ associated with it.63 For example, she argues that the expansion 
of security has enlarged, not diminished, the state: ‘…something akin to a security race 
ensures with both public and private competing…to offer security services.’64 Next, 
Zedner claims that security promises reassurance but in fact increases anxiety: ‘It is a 
deep irony that, by alerting citizens to risk and scattering the world with visible 
reminders of the threat of crime, it tends to increase subjective insecurity.’65 Thirdly, she 
claims that security is posited as a universal good but presumes social exclusion. That is, 
there is a common tendency, both individual and collective, to overstate exposure to risk 
and hence to demand ever greater protections, thus making people more isolated.66 She 
claims that because the pursuit of security entails significant costs, security should be 
justified: ‘Resort to security strategies should not be contemplated unless the potential 
harm is of sufficient gravity to justify the attendant costs of so doing.’67 In a separate 
piece, Zedner specifically discusses the liberty/security trade-off,68 which she describes 
as ‘perilous’.69 In a section titled ‘What tips the balance?’, she believes that all talk of 
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rebalancing presupposes a prior imbalance, so those proposing reform must ‘either 
identify a disequilibrium or externals factors that can be said to tip the balance out of 
kilter’.70  
 
The liberalism of Jeremy Waldron and Lucia Zedner seemingly acknowledge restrictions 
on individual liberty in the furtherance of public protection. But they oppose a sacrifice 
of freedoms of the individual for reasons of greater security without sufficient 
justification. For this author, however, this balance attaches insufficient weight to the 
ongoing threat of ‘super-terrorism’ from Islamist groups such as ISIL. The positives of 
enhanced state protection seem to have found a contemporary liberal voice in Loader 
and Walker’s Civilizing Security.71 They devote whole chapters of their book to the ‘good 
of security’,72 ‘the necessary virtue of the state’73 and ‘security as a global public good’.74  
They believe that security is a valuable public good – a ‘thick public good’75– a 
constitutive ingredient of the good society, and that the democratic state has a 
necessary and virtuous role to play in the production of this good.76 But to release this 
potential the authors believe that security needs ‘civilizing’.77 Why this is so is influenced 
significantly by traditional liberal concerns about the state: 
 
‘States – even those that claim with some justification to be ‘liberal’ or 
‘democratic’ – have a capacity when self-consciously pursuing a condition called 
‘security’ to act in a fashion injurious to it…They proceed in ways that trample over 
the basic liberties of citizens; that forge security for some groups while imposing 
illegitimate burdens of insecurity upon others, or that extend the coercive reach of 
the state – and security discourse – over social and political life. As monopoly 
  
21 
 
holders of the means of legitimate physical and symbolic violence, modern states 
possess a built-in, paradoxical tendency to undermine the very liberties and 
security they are constituted to protect.’ 78 
 
Thus, for Loader and Walker, the state is a great civilizing force, a necessary component 
of the good society. But if it is to take on this role, they claim the state must itself be 
civilized – made safe by and for democracy.79 
 
In conceiving a collective right to security, utilising ‘positive’ duties imposed on the state 
by established human rights, the author here is not entirely convinced by Hobbesian 
‘absolutism’ on the one hand and liberalism – at least its Lockean traditions – on the 
other. So, thus far, he is attracted to the more ‘pragmatic’ (my words) theories of 
liberalism post 9/11 echoed by Loader and Walker, which seem to draw the balance of 
security and rights much closer to the approach adopted by the author. But Loader and 
Walker’s Civilising Security was published in 2007. This was six years after the 9/11 
attacks in 2001, and two years after the 7/7 attacks in London in 2005. Perhaps in 
reconciliation of security with their defence of traditional liberal values there was some 
complacency creeping in? In recent years there has been the dramatic rise of ISIL, and its 
terror attacks, say, in mainland Europe: particularly in France and Belgium, close allies to 
the UK. These outrages serve only to remind states about the real and present terror 
threat they face. Bearing these concerns in mind, the author in the next section 
discusses another philosophy relevant to security, ‘communitarianism’. This theory lends 
greater support to the author’s conceptual foundation for his right to security than, say, 
Hobbesian ‘absolutism’, because, whilst it arguably draws on a model of security with, 
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say, ‘statist’ traditions, especially since 9/11, it does offer concessions to strands of 
liberalism. 
 
Communitarianism 
 
The author’s theoretical justification for a right to security is a compromise between the 
social contract theories of ‘state absolutism’ on the one hand and liberalism on the 
other. Some liberals are maybe right to be concerned about an overly expansive 
interpretation of security, in that there is then much less emphasis on rights restraining 
the power of the state and more emphasis on augmenting the power of the state, with 
perhaps little evidence to support it. However, liberals arguably pay too much attention 
to individualism and too little attention to community. The author’s right to security is 
borne out of ‘positive’ obligations imposed on the UK by virtue of, say, Article 2 of the 
ECHR, the right to life, for example, which would attach greater weight to the right of a 
‘group’ or ‘community’ to security than the liberties of individuals. He aims to ground 
the foundations for a ‘positive’, ‘collective’ right to security in, say, ‘communitarian’ 
criticisms of liberalism. That is, whilst the preservation of some rights such as freedom 
from torture are still very important, rights in general need to be balanced much less in 
favour of the individual and balanced much more in favour of the community. 
 
Recent theories of communitarianism are those advanced by, say, Amitai Etzioni80 and 
Mary Ann Glendon.81 For them, an important communitarian principle, which is 
particularly relevant to this piece, is redressing the balance between liberalism’s 
emphasis on personal autonomy and social responsibilities.82 Unless society does so, it 
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will continue to be self-centred and driven by self-interests.83 Indeed, they believe that 
the greatest danger for rights (and liberty more generally) arises when the social 
moorings of individuals are severed.84 
 
The liberal emphasis on individualism – and neglect of social responsibilities – inherits 
much from Locke, but the former inherits much from, say, the American tradition of 
human rights and the US Declaration of Independence of the United States in particular. 
Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse by Mary Ann Glendon is especially 
important in this regard. In chapter two of her book, which is titled, ‘The Illusion of 
Absoluteness’, Glendon critiques the seeming absolute nature of American rights talk.85 
She believes that this ‘rhetoric of absoluteness’ has the ill effect that it tends to 
downgrade rights into the mere expression of unbounded desires and wants: 
‘Excessively strong formulations express our most infantile instincts rather than our 
potential to be reasonable men and women. A country where we can do ‘anything we 
want’ is not a republic of free people attempting to order their lives together.’86 And 
American rights talk, in its absoluteness, is silent on responsibilities: it seems to condone 
acceptance of the benefits of living in a democratic social welfare state, without 
accepting the corresponding personal civic obligations.87 On this issue, Etzioni notes, for 
example, that the majority of young people feel strongly that they have a right to 
demand a trial before a jury of their peers if charged with a crime; but many indicate 
that they would not rather serve on a jury. This is ‘illogical’ as well as being ‘indecent and 
selfish’, he believes.88 
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In conceiving his right to security this author believes that human rights are predicated 
on security – a view shared by Etzioni. For Etzioni the right to security is more 
fundamental than any others, so much so, ‘it ought to be treated as a class unto itself’.89 
All other rights are contingent on the protection of life – whereas the right to security is 
not similarly contingent on any other rights.90 He declares: 
 
‘It sounds simplistic to state that dead people cannot exercise their rights, whereas 
those who are living securely at least have the possibility of exercising more rights 
in the future. However, it is still an essential truth: when and where the right to 
security is violated, all other rights are violated as well.’91 
 
So for communitarians like Etzioni security is a precondition for the enjoyment of rights 
and freedoms – a ‘basic’ right from which all others rights flow. And in reference to, say, 
security measures post 9/11, he proclaims: ‘True patriots…realize that one must protect 
the nation from all enemies and the essence of what it means to be patriotic is to 
protect our Constitution and its Bill of Rights with all our might…Only when we have 
failed to this will have done the terrorists’ job for them.’92 
 
In a separate piece, Etzioni elaborates further on what states must do to protect 
themselves from terrorism. Seemingly sharing this author’s belief in the significant 
curtailment of the rights of terror suspects for reasons of security, Etzioni criticises those 
who urge that suspected terrorists are to be treated like, say, other criminals; assumed 
innocent until proven guilty; tried in civil courts according to similar procedures 
employed in the trying of other criminals; afforded several layers of appeals if found 
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guilty; and incarcerated and released once they have served their terms. Importantly, he 
suggests that such an approach accords ‘terrorists more rights than they are entitled to, 
and unduly and significantly increases risks to the security of innocent citizens’.93 
Etzioni’s explanation for why terrorists cannot be treated as ordinary criminals is that 
they need to be prevented rather than deterred: ‘you cannot punish people who commit 
suicide after the fact.’94 
 
The author’s ‘positive’, ‘communitarian’ right to security  
 
The theme of this work is a positive, human right to security in the UK grounded in the 
state’s obligations to protect life and prevent harm, as per, say, Articles 2(1) and 3 of the 
ECHR. And with a greater focus on the community rather than on either the individual or 
the state, this piece is further suggesting a positive, communitarian, right to security. If 
the author were to conceive his ‘positive’, ’communitarian’ right to security as one in 
express terms, then a model for such a right could be Article 23(1) of ACHPR. And there 
is s.12(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, referencing a right to 
security. This section includes the right not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or 
without just cause; not to be detained without trial; not to be tortured in any way; and 
not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way. But it also states 
that everyone has the right to free from all forms of violence from either public or private 
sources (my italics). 
 
Conceiving, say, s.12(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa as a model for 
a right to security is not without its difficulties, however. Lazarus has written much about 
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a right to security. Though not necessarily discussing s.12(1) in particular, the problems 
she identifies are still very pertinent. First, she believes that a right to security like this is 
simply too broad to be legally workable.95 Its apparent lack of sufficient certainty blurs 
the rights that flow from it, or even the correlative duties imposed on the state that 
might allow for such rights to be fulfilled.96 And since the right is connected to 
perceptions of future risk, she believes that there is no end to the kinds of risks that 
would have to be averted.97 Equally, it says nothing about how foreseeable the risks 
have to be in order to establish a breach of the right.98 
 
Lazarus’s objections do not end there: she is also concerned about ‘duplication’, in that 
the right to security does not seem to add anything to the other rights that are meant to 
be secured.99 Such a right, she claims, should only protect that which other self-standing 
and established rights cannot, on their face, protect. Consequently, the ‘right to security’ 
should not encompass long established and self-standing rights such as the rights to life, 
liberty, freedom from torture and so on.100 She continues: politicians claim that the ‘right 
to security’ is a ‘basic’ or meta-right’ on which all other rights are based.101 But this risks 
slipping from a right to security merely existing to affirm other rights, that is, a ‘right to 
secure rights’, to a belief which actively ‘securitises’ those rights. And in invoking security 
as a means to extend the ‘state’s coercive reach’, we may end up ‘righting security’.102 
Lazarus therefore calls for the courts to stem the ‘rhetoric of security’ in a global 
environment of insecurity and ensure that the right does not become the catch-all 
justificatory foundation for a range of self-standing fundamental rights.103 
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In the face of these well considered criticisms, the author cannot ignore the obvious 
challenges of implementation of a right to security such as this. Indeed, even Etzioni 
expresses limits to security. He is not a Hobbesian ‘absolutist’: ‘to seek full-fledged 
security, to obviate all threats, to end fear, puts us on the slippery slope at the bottom of 
which is a police state’.104 He believes, therefore, that there must be restrictions on the 
power of the state.105 Indeed, one may recall the author’s earlier acknowledgement that 
in fulfilling their duties to prevent terrorism, as per UN Security Council Resolution 2249 
(2015), states must also respect their human rights obligations. Thus, in the following 
paragraphs the author suggests limits to his collective right to security. 
 
First, who will have standing to enforce such a right? The author is expanding the 
interpretation of, say, the right to life beyond its traditional ‘positive’, protection of a 
specific individual, or individuals, but in so doing, he is relying on communitarian ideals 
as a theoretical model for doing so. If the author’s right to security is to be justiciable,106 
it is logical, perhaps, to draw on this theory’s definition of ‘community’ to explain the 
‘standing’ of those who can claim such a right. Etzioni, for example, describes 
‘community’ as ‘kin, friends, neighbours, and other community members’,107 so the 
provenance of the group for the purposes of state protection would be relatively small. 
Thus, this author is not articulating an all embracing duty imposed on the UK authorities 
to protect everyone; there would have to be a ‘communitarian’ nexus between the 
individual making the claim and the threat that the state had allegedly failed to avert. 
 
Communitarians are critical of, say, liberalism’s overemphasis on rights but do not wish 
to qualify every right of the individual108 – an approach shared by this author. Thus, in 
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‘mapping’ the author’s right to security, it is important to look at the specific human 
right of the individual being curtailed for reasons of public protection, in that some rights 
are more important than others. First, there are those freedoms like Article 3 of the 
ECHR, the prohibition on torture, which in law, are ‘absolute’ and can never be infringed. 
(They are also ‘non-derogable’ in times of war or public emergency, as per, say, Article 
15(2) of the ECHR.) Much as there may be pressing situations demanding the torture of a 
terror suspect for information, that is, in the so-called ‘ticking bomb’ situation, 
elsewhere, the author has rejected such a practice.109 (A presumption of guilt of a 
suspect and the reliability of the evidence gained though torture being obvious 
examples.) Thus, logically, here the author would exclude violating this freedom of the 
individual from the reach of his collective right to security. 
 
Similarly, the right to life is ranked with freedom from torture in terms of its importance. 
Previously, this author has examined the killing of Jean Charles de Menezes by firearms 
officers of Britain’s Metropolitan Police in 2005, for example. At the time de Menezes 
was suspected of being a suicide bomber, attempting to commemorate the suicide 
bombings in London on 7th July. The author assessed the ‘positive’ duty to protect life, as 
per Article 2(1) of the ECHR, and the ‘negative’ right of the person who died, de 
Menezes, not be unlawfully killed, as per Article 2(2).110 In conclusion, accounting for the 
many features of Article 2, ‘positive’ and ‘negative’, the author found that the balance 
fell in favour of the state, that is, de Menezes was not unlawfully killed. Nonetheless, if in 
the event that the killing was later held to contravene Article 2, the author did believe, 
therefore, that insufficient weight would have been attached to the community’s right to 
be protected from terrorism, especially suicide violence where the risks to life were that 
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far greater. But in calling for a standard more beneficial to the public interest, the author 
neither called for a unilateral relaxation of existing terror laws in favour of state 
authorities nor an extension to them.111 Thus, whilst the author calls here for a more 
expansive interpretation of the UK’s duty to protect life, as per Article 2(1), again, in 
mapping his right to security, he limits its reach to specific threats to public safety such 
as those involving suspected suicide bombers. 
 
Moving away from basic liberties such as freedom from torture and the right to life in 
the ‘hierarchy’ of human rights, one ‘finds’ special rights – that is, those freedoms that 
can be infringed but only in limited circumstances – such as Article 5 of the ECHR, the 
right to liberty, and Article 6 of the ECHR, the right to a fair trial. Because these rights are 
seemingly less important than those discussed above, elsewhere the author has adopted 
a more expansive interpretation of ‘positive’ obligations justifying their curtailment, in 
supporting, for example, the UK’s Terrorism Preventions and Investigation Measures 
(‘TPIMs’).112 TPIMS, such as home residence requirements, are initiatives which are 
designed to disrupt the activities of terror suspects, whom the UK cannot prosecute 
because of insufficient evidence to satisfy a criminal trial. The TPIMS scheme extends the 
reach of state interference: arguably, a substantial control over the activities of a suspect 
violates the right to liberty, as per Article 5 of the ECHR; the imposition of an order 
merely on the civilian standard of proof, ‘a balance of probabilities’, violates the right to 
a fair trial, as per Article 6 of the ECHR; and the effects on the spouse and children of a 
suspect violate their right to private and family life, as per Article 8 of the ECHR. 
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Conclusion 
 
In 2014 78% of all deaths and 57% of all attacks in 2014 occurred in just five countries: 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan and Syria. Europe, and the UK in particular, is 
relatively safe from terror attacks. Indeed, globally, at least 437,000 people are 
murdered each year, which is over the 13 times more than the number of victims of 
terrorism.113 That said, Bernard Hogan-Howe, the Chief Constable of the Metropolitan 
Police Service, Britain’s most senior police officer, has said that recent terror atrocities in 
France will happen in the UK: they were a matter of ‘when, not if’.114 
 
Contributing to the debate about states’ need to provide effective protection to their 
citizens from ISIL this piece has advocated a human right to security in the UK – but not 
the furtherance of the traditional liberal, right to security of the individual from the 
state: a collective, right of security from threats to public safety from non-state actors 
such as suspected terrorists. A foundation for such a human right are the ‘positive’ 
obligations imposed on European states to protect life, as per Article 2(1) of the ECHR, 
and prevent injury, as per Article 3 of the ECHR. Articles 1 and 13 of the ECHR are 
important considerations, too. 
 
The social contract theories of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke emphasise the state’s 
responsibility to provide security so serve – at least initially – as theoretical models for 
the author’s conception of his ‘positive’ right to security. The author finds the lure of 
Hobbesian ‘absolutism’ particularly seductive, especially as he supports substantial in-
roads into the rights of the individual for the peace and order that would inevitably 
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follow. However, in acquiring significant powers, Locke, for example, believed that the 
Hobbesian sovereign could itself pose a threat to security. The totalitarian regimes of, 
say, Stalin and Hitler were ‘absolutist’ ones seemingly supported by the writings of 
Hobbes, in that significant curtailments of human rights were justified on the basis of 
public protection, but these states were themselves a substantial threat to security. 
However, this is to do Hobbes an injustice: these states had in fact delegitimised 
themselves in the eyes of Hobbesian philosophy as the covenant upon which individuals 
had qualified their rights in exchange for protection was spectacularly broken. Thus, a 
right of rebellion to institute a new sovereign was permitted. That said, Locke believed 
that to legitimise a right of rebellion only when the state had gone too far – in enslaving 
its subjects, for example – was too late. 
 
Moreover, in conceiving the Hobbesian model as the basis for public protection of 
democracy, the state seemingly undermines the very ideals it is seeking to preserve – is 
it doing the terrorists’ job for them? And is there actual evidence that substantial gains 
in state power in the last 15 years or so, as the terror threat has continued, have actually 
made nations more safe? So liberal concerns about significant erosions of individual 
freedoms post 9/11 should not be overlooked.115 Indeed, states must not ignore their 
human rights responsibilities in their efforts to counter terrorism. 
 
Plotting a course through these models of state absolutism and liberalism one ‘finds’ 
communitarianism. In this piece, therefore, the author is advocating a ‘positive’ right to 
security grounded in the ideals of ‘communitarianism’ reflected in the writings of, say, 
Amitai Etzioni and Mary Ann Glendon. Etzioni and Glendon are critical of liberalism’s 
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Lockean traditions of absolute freedoms, in that they attach too much emphasis to rights 
and too little weight to responsibilities. Indeed, since 9/11, for example, Etzioni has 
emphasised the significance of security as a ‘basic’ right: to enjoy human rights requires 
security but not vice versa – a view shared by this author. But of equal significance 
Etzioni also warns against too much sacrifice of individual freedoms for reasons of public 
protection.  
 
To make the author’s ‘positive’, ‘communitarian’ right to security more legally workable, 
here he, too, suggests limits to its exercise. (Thus, the author still sees his right to 
security as primarily a justiciable one enforceable before the courts.) He does not 
advocate an all embracing duty imposed on the UK to protect everyone, justifying the 
broad erosion of individual liberties for the good of preventing terrorism: there would 
have to be a ‘communitarian’ nexus between the individual making the claim and the 
threat that the state had allegedly failed to avert. But in situations not involving the 
absolute rights of, say, a terror suspect, the author suggests that his ‘communitarian’ 
right to security should be accorded much greater weight in the liberty/security trade-off 
over, say, the rights to liberty and fair trial of the individual. Thus, initiatives in the UK 
such as TPIMS to prevent terrorism should not engage judicial scrutiny particularly 
intensively, when examining suspected violations of the rights of the individual. 
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